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a b s t r a c t
We study the complexity of the following problem: Given two weighted voting games G′
and G′′ that each contain a player p, in which of these games is p’s power index value
higher? We study this problem with respect to both the Shapley–Shubik power index
and the Banzhaf power index. Our main result is that for both of these power indices the
problem is complete for probabilistic polynomial time (i.e., is PP-complete). We apply our
results to partially resolve some recently proposed problems regarding the complexity of
weighted voting games. We also study the complexity of the raw Shapley–Shubik power
index. Deng and Papadimitriou showed that the raw Shapley–Shubik power index is #P-
metric-complete.We strengthen this by showing that the rawShapley–Shubik power index
is many–one complete for #P. And our strengthening cannot possibly be further improved
to parsimonious completeness, since we observe that, in contrast with the raw Banzhaf
power index, the raw Shapley–Shubik power index is not #P-parsimonious-complete.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In an abstract, direct democracy, each member in a certain sense has equal potential for impact on the decisions that
the society makes. However, in many practical decision-making scenarios it is reasonable to give up this noble idea and
consider weighted voting instead. Here are a few motivating examples. In a country divided into districts it makes sense
to give each district voting power proportional to its population (consider, e.g., the US House of Representatives or various
decision making processes within the European Union). In fact, the power that various apportionment methods give to the
US states in its House of Representatives has been studied in terms of howwell it is proportional to the sizes of the states [9].
In a business setting, stockholders in a company might hope to have voting power proportional to the amount of stock they
own.Within computer science, Dwork et al. [4] suggested building ameta search engine for theweb via treating other search
engines as voters in an election. It would only be natural to weigh the participating search engines with their (quantified in
some way) quality. Naturally, one can provide many other examples.
The focus of this paper is on the computational complexity of the following issue: Given an individual and two weighted
voting scenarios (in each of them our individual might have different weight and each scenario might involve different sets
of voters with different weights), in which one of them is our individual more influential? (We provide a formal definition of
this problem in Section 1.1.) This problemhas a very naturalmotivation. For example, consider a company thatwishes to join
some business consortium and has a choice among several consortia (e.g., consider an airline deciding which airline alliance
to join). It is natural to assume that within each consortium companiesmake decisions via weighted voting, with companies
weighted, e.g., via their size or revenue or some combination thereof. In a political context, members of the European Union
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sometimes try to promote new schemes of distributing vote weights among EU members. It is important for the countries
involved to see which scheme is better for them. One can easily give many other applications of the issue we study.
Formally, we model the above problem via comparing the values of power index functions – in our case those of Shapley
and Shubik [15] and of Banzhaf ([1], see also [6]) – of a particular player within two given weighted voting games. Our main
result is that this problem is PP-complete for both the Shapley–Shubik power index and the Banzhaf power index. Let us
now define our problem formally.
1.1. The power-index comparison problem
We model weighted voting via so-called weighted voting games. An n-player weighted voting game is a sequence of n
nonnegative integer weights, w1, . . . , wn, together with a quota q. We denote it as (w1, . . . , wn; q). We refer to the player
with weight wi as the i’th player. Weighted voting games model the following scenario: The players are given a yes/no
question (e.g., should we lower the taxes? should we buy out our competitors?) and each player either agrees (answers yes)
or disagrees (answers no). If the total weight of the voters who agree is at least as high as the quota then the result of the
game is yes and otherwise it is no.
Let G be a voting game (w1, . . . , wn; q). Any subset of {1, . . . , n} is a coalition in G. We say that a coalition S is successful
if
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q. We define succG(S) to be 1 if S is a successful coalition for G and to be 0 otherwise.
Interestingly, the relation between the effective power of a player within a voting game and his or her weight is not as
simple as one might think. Consider game G = (8, 7, 2; 9), i.e., a game with quota q = 9 and three players with weights
8, 7, and 2, respectively. It is easy to see that in this game any coalition of at least two players is successful. In effect, each
of the players can influence the final result of the game to exactly the same degree, regardless of the fact that their weights
differ significantly. Thus when analyzing weighted voting games it is standard to measure players’ power using, e.g., the
Shapley–Shubik power index [15] or the Banzhaf power index [1,6].
In essence, these power indices measure the probability that, assuming some coalition formation model, our designated
player is critical for the forming coalition. By criticalwemean here that the coalition is successful with our designated player
but is not successful without him or her.
Let G = (w1, . . . , wn; q) be a voting game, let i be a player in this game, and let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of all players
of G. The value of the Banzhaf power index of i in G is defined as Banzhaf(G, i) = Banzhaf∗(G,i)
2n−1 , where Banzhaf
∗(G, i) is
the raw version of the index, Banzhaf∗(G, i) = ∑S⊆N−{i}(succG(S ∪ {i}) − succG(S)). The Shapley–Shubik power index
of player i in game G is defined as SS(G, i) = SS∗(G,i)n! , where SS∗(G, i) is the raw version of the index, SS∗(G, i) =∑
S⊆N−{i} ‖S‖!(n− ‖S‖ − 1)!(succG(S ∪ {i})− succG(S)).
Intuitively, Banzhaf(G, i) gives the probability that a randomly chosen coalition of players in N −{i} is not successful but
would become successful had player i joined in. The intuition for the Shapley–Shubik index is thatwe count the proportion of
permutations for which a given player is pivotal. Given a permutation pi of {1, . . . , n}, the pi(i)’th player is pivotal if it holds
that the coalition {pi(1), pi(2), . . . , pi(i)} is successful and the coalition {pi(1), pi(2), . . . , pi(i−1)} is not. This permutation-
based intuition is motivated by the view of the successful-coalition formation as the process of players joining in in random
order. Naturally, the first player thatmakes the coalition successful is crucial and so the idea is tomeasure power via counting
how often our player-of-interest is pivotal.
The focus of this paper is on the computational complexity analysis of the following problem.
Definition 1.1. Let f be either the Shapley–Shubik or the Banzhaf power index. By PowerComparef we mean the problem
where the input (G′,G′′, i) contains two weighted voting games, G′ = (w′1, . . . , w′n, q′) and G′′ = (w′′1 , . . . , w′′n , q′′), and an
integer i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and where we ask whether f (G′, i) > f (G′′, i).
Note that in the above definition we assume that both games have the same number of players. At first this might seem
to be a weakness but it is easy to see that given two games with different numbers of players we can easily pad the smaller
one with weight-0 players. On the other hand, the assumption that both games have the same number of players allows us
to solve the problem via comparing the raw values of the index: The scaling factor for both games is the same and thus it
does not affect the result of the comparison.
1.2. Computational complexity
We briefly review some notions and notations. We fix the alphabetΣ = {0, 1}, and we assume that all the problems we
consider are encoded in a natural, efficient manner over Σ . By | · | we mean the length function. We assume 〈·, ·〉 to be a
standard, natural pairing function such that |〈x, y〉| = 2(|x| + |y|)+ 2.
The main result of this paper, Theorem 2.1, says that the power-index comparison problem is PP-complete both for the
Shapley–Shubik power index and for the Banzhaf power index. The class PP, probabilistic polynomial time, was defined by
Simon [14] and Gill [7]. A language L ⊆ Σ∗ belongs to PP if and only if there exists a polynomial p and a polynomial-time
computable relation R such that x ∈ L ⇐⇒ ‖{w ∈ Σp(|x|) | R(x, w) holds}‖ > 2p(|x|)−1. PP captures the set of languages
having a probabilistic Turing machine that on precisely the elements of the set has strictly more than 50% probability of
acceptance. Let us mention that PP is a very powerful class. For example, it is well-known that NP is a subset of PP (as
are even various larger classes). Via Toda’s Theorem [16], we know that PH ⊆ PPP. That is, PP is at least as powerful as
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polynomial-time hierarchy, give or take the flexibility of polynomial-time Turing reductions. Many other properties of PP
have been established in the literature.
Let us now recall the definition of the class #P [17]. For each NP machine N (i.e., for each nondeterministic polynomial-
time machine N), by #accN(x) we mean the number of accepting computation paths of N running with input x. A function
f , f : Σ∗ → N, belongs to #P if and only if there is an NP machine N such that (∀x ∈ Σ∗)[f (x) = #accN(x)]. #P is, in a
very loose sense, a functional counterpart of PP. For example, P#P = PPP [2]. More typically, #P is described as the counting
analogue of NP.
As is usual, we say that a language L is hard for a complexity class C if every language in C polynomial-time many–
one reduces to L. If in addition L belongs to C then we say that L is C-complete. A language A polynomial-time many–one
reduces to a language B if there exists a polynomial-time computable function f such that for each string x ∈ Σ∗ it holds
that x ∈ A ⇐⇒ f (x) ∈ B. On the other hand, there is no one agreed-upon notion of completeness for function classes. For
example, Valiant [17] in his seminal paper used Turing reductions but other people have preferred notions such as Krentel’s
metric reductions [10], Zankó’s many–one reductions (for functions) [19], and Simon’s [14] parsimonious reductions.
In the context of power index functions, Prasad and Kelly [13] (implicitly) showed that the (raw) Banzhaf power index is
#P-parsimonious-complete and Deng and Papadimitriou [5] established that the (raw) Shapley–Shubik power index is #P-
metric-complete (regarding the complexity analysis of power indices, we alsomention the paper ofMatsui andMatsui [11]).
We now review parsimonious and metric reductions, as those underpin the notions of parsimonious-completeness and
metric-completeness.
Definition 1.2. (i) [10] A function f : Σ∗ → N metric reduces to a function g : Σ∗ → N if there exist two polynomial-
time computable functions, ϕ and ψ , such that (∀x ∈ Σ∗)[f (x) = ψ(x, g(ϕ(x)))].
(ii) [19] A function f : Σ∗ → N many–one reduces to a function g : Σ∗ → N if there exist two polynomial-time
computable functions, ϕ and ψ , such that (∀x ∈ Σ∗)[f (x) = ψ(g(ϕ(x)))].1
(iii) [14] f parsimoniously reduces to g if there is a polynomial-time computable function ϕ such that (∀x ∈ Σ∗)[f (x) =
g(ϕ(x))].
Note that (a) if f parsimoniously reduces to g , then f many–one reduces to g , and (b) if f many–one reduces to g , then f
metric reduces to g . Given a function classC, we say that a function f isC-parsimonious-complete if f ∈ C and each function
inC parsimonious reduces to f .C-metric-completeness andC-many–one-completeness are defined analogously. Typically,
parsimonious-complete functions are easier to work with than functions that are merely metric-complete or many–one-
complete. In particular, our proof of Theorem 2.11 is more involved than our proof of Theorem 2.4 because, as we note, the
raw Shapley–Shubik power index is not parsimoniously complete.
2. Main results
Our main result, Theorem 2.1, says that the power index comparison problem is PP-complete. This section is devoted to
building the infrastructure for Theorem 2.1’s proof and giving that proof. We also show that the raw Shapley–Shubik power
index is #P-many–one-complete but not #P-parsimonious-complete.
Theorem 2.1. Let f be either the Banzhaf or the Shapley–Shubik power index. The problem PowerComparef is PP-complete.
We start via showing PP-membership of a problem closely related to our PowerCompareBanzhaf and PowerCompareSS
problems. Let f be a #P function and let Comparef be the language {〈x, y〉 | x, y ∈ Σ∗ ∧ f (x) > f (y)}. (PowerCompareBanzhaf
and PowerCompareSS are essentially, up to aminor definitional issue, incarnations of Comparef for appropriate functions f .)
Lemma 2.2. Let f be a #P function. The language Comparef is in PP.
Proof. Let f be an arbitrary #P function and let N be an NPmachine such that f = #accN . Without the loss of generality, we
assume that there is a polynomial q such that for each input x ∈ Σ∗ all computation paths of N make exactly q(|x|) binary
nondeterministic choices. Thus each computation path of N on input x can be represented as a stringw inΣq(|x|).
In order to show that Comparef is in PP we need to provide a polynomial-time computable relation R and a polynomial p
such that for each string z = 〈x, y〉 it holds that: z ∈ Comparef ⇐⇒ ‖{w ∈ Σp(|z|) | R(z, w) holds}‖ > 2p(|z|)−1. We now
define such R and p. Let us fix two strings, x and y, and let z = 〈x, y〉 and n = |z|. We define p(n) = q(n) + 1 and, for each
stringw = w0w1 . . . wp(n)−1 ∈ Σp(n), we define R(z, w) as follows:
Case 1. If w0 = 0 then R(z, w) is true exactly if the string w1, . . . , wq(|x|) denotes an accepting computation path of N on
x and the symbolswq(|x|)+1 throughwp(n)−1 are all 0. R(z, w) is false otherwise.
Case 2. If w0 = 1 then R(z, w) is false exactly if the string w1, . . . , wq(|y|) denotes an accepting computation path of N on
y and the symbolswq(|x|)+1 throughwp(n)−1 are all 0. R(z, w) is true otherwise.
1 Note that Zankó’s many–one reduction is an analogue for functions of the standard many–one reduction notion for sets. To avoid confusion, we
mention to the reader that the term ‘‘functional many–one reduction’’ (which we do not use here) is sometimes used in the literature [18] as a synonym
for ‘‘parsimonious reductions’’.
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Via analyzing the above two cases it is easy to see that there are exactly f (x) + (2p(n)−1 − f (y)) = f (x) − f (y) + 2p(n)−1
strings w ∈ Σp(n) for which R(z, w) is true. This value is greater than 2p(n)−1 if and only if f (x) > f (y). Thus the relation R
and the polynomial p jointly witness that Comparef belongs to PP. 
Lemma 2.2 gives an upper bound on the complexity of Comparef (assuming that f ∈ #P). We now prove a matching
lower bound, PP-completeness, for the case that f is #P-parsimonious-complete.
Lemma 2.3. Let f be a #P-parsimonious-complete function. The language Comparef is PP-complete.
Proof. Let f be a #P-parsimonious-complete function. Via Lemma 2.2 we know that Comparef is in PP and thus to show
PP-completeness it remains to show PP-hardness. We do so via reducing an arbitrary PP language L to Comparef . Let L be an
arbitrary PP language. By definition, there exists a polynomial-time relation R and a polynomial p such that for each string
x ∈ Σ∗ it holds that x ∈ L ⇐⇒ ‖{y ∈ Σp(|x|) | R(x, y) holds}‖ > 2p(|x|)−1.We define two functions, g1 and g2, such that
g1(x) = ‖{y ∈ Σp(|x|) | R(x, y) holds}‖ and g2(x) = 2p(|x|)−1. It is easy to see that both g1 and g2 are in #P. g1 can be computed
via an NP machine that on input x guesses a binary string y of length p(|x|) and accepts if and only if R(x, y) holds. g2 can be
computed via a machine that on input x guesses a binary string of length 2p(|x|)−1 and then accepts. Naturally, x ∈ L if and
only if g1(x) > g2(x).
Since f is #P-parsimonious-complete, both g1 and g2 parsimoniously reduce to f . Let ϕ1 be the reduction function for g1
and let ϕ2 be the reduction function for g2. We have that for each string x it holds that g1(x) = f (ϕ1(x)) and g2(x) = f (ϕ2(x)).
Our reduction from L to Comparef works as follows. On input xweoutput the string z = 〈ϕ1(x), ϕ2(x)〉. Clearly, this can be
done in polynomial time. To show correctness it is enough to recall that x ∈ L if and only if g1(x) > g2(x), which is equivalent
to testing whether z is in Comparef . Since Lwas chosen as an arbitrary PP language, this proves PP-completeness. 
We are almost ready to show that PowerCompareBanzhaf is PP-complete. However, in order to do so, we need to justify
the claim that the raw version of the Banzhaf power index is #P-parsimonious-complete. (This was shown implicitly in the
work of Prasad and Kelly [13], but we feel that it is important to explicitly outline the proof.)
One of our important tools here (and later on) is the function#X3C. The input to theX3Cproblem is a set B = {b1, . . . , b3k}
and a family S = {S1, . . . , Sn} of 3-element subsets of B. The X3C problem asks whether there exists a collection of exactly
k sets in S whose union is B. #X3C(B, S) is the number of solutions of the X3C instance (B, S).
Hunt et al. [8] showed that #X3C is parsimonious complete for #P. This is very useful for us as the standard reduction from
#X3C to #SubsetSum (see, e.g., [12, Theorem 9.10]; #SubsetSum is the function that accepts as input a vector of nonnegative
integers (s1, . . . , sn; q) and returns the number of subsets of {s1, . . . , sn} that sum up to q) is parsimonious and Prasad and
Kelly’s reduction from #SubsetSum to Banzhaf∗ (the raw version of Banzhaf’s power index) is parsimonious as well. Since
Banzhaf∗ is in #P, Banzhaf∗ is #P-parsimonious-complete. Thus the following theorem is, essentially, a direct consequence
of Lemma 2.3.
Theorem 2.4. PowerCompareBanzhaf is PP-complete.
Proof. The raw version of the Banzhaf power index is #P-parsimonious-complete and so, via Lemma 2.3, CompareBanzhaf∗ is
PP-complete. Via a slight misuse of notation, we can say that CompareBanzhaf∗ accepts as input two weighted voting games,
G′ and G′′, and two players, p′ and p′′, such that p′ participates in G′ and p′′ participates in G′′ and accepts if and only if
Banzhaf∗(G′, p′) > Banzhaf∗(G′, p′′). We give a reduction from CompareBanzhaf∗ to PowerCompareBanzhaf.
Let G′, p′ and G′′, p′′ be our input to the CompareBanzhaf∗ problem. We can assume that G′ and G′′ have the same number
of players. If G′ and G′′ do not have the same number of players then it is easy to see that the gamewith fewer players can be
padded with players whose weight is equal to this game’s quota value. Such a padding leaves the raw Banzhaf power index
values of the game’s original players unchanged. (The reason for this is that any coalition that includes any of the padding
candidates is alreadywinning and so none of the original players is critical to the success of the coalition, and so the coalition
does not contribute to the original players’ power index values.)
We form two games, K ′ and K ′′, that are identical to games G′ and G′′, respectively, except that K ′ lists player p′ as
first and G′′ lists player p′′ as first. Our reduction’s output is (K ′, K ′′, 1). Naturally, Banzhaf(K ′, 1) > Banzhaf(K ′′, 1) if
and only if Banzhaf∗(G′, p′) > Banzhaf∗(G′′, p′′). Also, clearly, K ′ and K ′′ can be computed in polynomial time. Thus we
have successfully reduced CompareBanzhaf∗ to PowerCompareBanzhaf. This shows PP-hardness of PowerCompareBanzhaf. PP-
membership of PowerCompareBanzhaf is, essentially, a simple consequence of Lemma 2.2. This completes the proof. 
Let us now focus on the computational complexity of the power index comparison problem for the case of Shapley–
Shubik. It would be nice if the raw Shapley–Shubik power indexwere #P-parsimonious-complete. If that were the case then
we could establish PP-completeness of PowerCompareSS in essentially the same way as we did for PowerCompareBanzhaf.
Thus it is natural to askwhether the Shapley–Shubik power index (i.e., its raw version) is #P-parsimonious-complete. Prasad
and Kelly [13] at the end of their paper, after – in effect – showing #P-parsimonious-completeness of the raw Banzhaf
power index (their Theorem 4), write: ‘‘Such a straightforward approach does not seem possible with the Shapley–Shubik
[power index]’’. We reinforce their intuition by now proving that the raw Shapley–Shubik power index in fact is not #P-
parsimonious-complete.
Theorem 2.5. The raw Shapley–Shubik power index (i.e., SS∗) is not #P-parsimonious-complete.
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Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that SS∗ is #P-parsimonious-complete. Thus for each natural number
k there is a weighted voting game G and a player i within G such that SS∗(G, i) = k. This is the case because the function
f (x) = x belongs to #P (we assume that the ‘‘output x’’ is an integer obtained via a standard bijection between Σ∗ and N)
and if SS∗ is #P-parsimonious-complete then there has to be a parsimonious reduction from f to SS∗.
Let G be an arbitrary voting game with n ≥ 4 players and let i be a player in G. By definition, SS∗(G, i) is a sum of terms
of the form k!(n − k − 1)!, where k is some value in {0, . . . , n − 1}. Since n ≥ 4, each such term is even and thus SS∗(G, i)
is even. The raw Shapley–Shubik power index of any player in a game with at most 3 players is at most 3! = 6 and thus
there is no input on which SS∗ yields the value 7. This contradicts the assumption that SS∗ is #P-parsimonious-complete
and completes the proof. 
So thewell-known result of Deng and Papadimitriou [5] that the rawShapley–Shubik power index is #P-metric-complete
cannot be strengthened to #P-parsimonious-completeness. Theorem 2.5 prevents us from directly using Lemma 2.3 to
show that PowerCompareSS is PP-complete. Nonetheless, via the following set of results not only do we establish that
PowerCompareSS is PP-complete, but we also strengthen the result of Deng and Papadimitriou via showing that the raw
Shapley–Shubik power index is #P-many–one-complete (i.e., is #P-complete w.r.t. Zankó’s many–one reductions [19]).
To establish our results we need to be able to build X3C instances that satisfy certain properties. Fact 2.6 below lists three
basic transformations that we use to enforce these properties.
Fact 2.6. Let (B, S) be an instance of X3C and let b1, b2, . . . , b6 be elements that do not belong to B. Let B1 = {b1, b2, b3},
B2 = {b4, b5, b6}, B3 = {b1, b4, b5} and B4 = {b1, b4, b6}. The following transformations preserve the number of solutions of the
input instance:
(i) g(B, S) = (B ∪ B1, S ∪ {B1}),
(ii) h′(B, S) = (B ∪ B1 ∪ B2, S ∪ {B1, B2, B3}),
(iii) h′′(B, S) = (B ∪ B1 ∪ B2, S ∪ {B1, B2, B3, B4}).
In the following lemma we use these transformations to, in some sense, normalize X3C instances.
Lemma 2.7. There is a polynomial-time algorithm that given an X3C instance X = (B, S) outputs instance X ′′ = (B′′, S′′) such
that #X3C(X ′′) = #X3C(X) and 13 ‖B′′‖‖S′′‖ = 23 .
Proof. Let X = (B, S) be our input X3C instance and let 3k = ‖B‖ and m = ‖S‖. Let g and h′′ be the transformations as in
Fact 2.6. The idea of our algorithm is to apply transformation g to X so many times as to achieve the 23 ratio. Let t be some
nonnegative integer and let (Bt , St) = g(t)(B, S). We observe that
1
3 ‖Bt‖
‖St‖ = k+tm+t and that if t = 2m−3k (assuming this value
is nonnegative) then k+tm+t = 23 .
Our algorithm works as follows. First, we form instance X ′ = (B′, S′) such that 2‖S′‖ − 3 · 13‖B′‖ ≥ 0. If 2m − 3k ≥ 0
then we set X ′ = X and otherwise we repeatedly apply transformation h′′, until this condition is met. (It is easy to see that
d 3k−2m2 e applications are sufficient.) Then we derive the instance X ′′ from X ′ via 2‖S′‖ − 3 · 13‖B′‖ applications of g . That is,
X ′′ = g(2‖S′‖−3· 13 ‖B′‖)(X ′).
Naturally, the algorithm runs in polynomial time. The correctness follows via the observation in the first paragraph and
the fact that transformations g and h′′ preserve the number of solutions. 
Finally, we are ready to show that the raw Shapley–Shubik power index is #P-many–one-complete.
Theorem 2.8. The raw Shapley–Shubik power index (i.e., SS∗) is #P-many–one-complete.
Proof. The raw Shapley–Shubik power index is in #P and thus it remains to show that it is #P-many–one-hard. To do
so, we give a many–one reduction from #X3C′ to SS∗. #X3C′ is a restriction of #X3C to instances X = (B, S) such that:
(1)
1
3 ‖B‖
‖S‖ = 23 . (2) If n is a nonnegative integer such that 13‖B‖ = 2n and ‖S‖ = 3n then there is a nonnegative integer t such
that n = 4t . To see that the thus restricted #X3C function is #P-parsimonious-complete it is enough to consider Lemma 2.7
and transformation h′ from Fact 2.6.
Let ϕs be the standard, parsimonious reduction from #X3C to #SubsetSum (see, e.g., [12, Theorem 9.10]). ϕs has the
property that given an instance (B, S), where ‖B‖ = 3k and ‖S‖ = m, ϕs(B, S) is an instance (s1, . . . , sm; q) of SubsetSum
such that every subset of {s1, . . . , sm} that sums up to q has exactly k elements. Given such an instance (s1, . . . , sm; q),
Deng and Papadimitriou [5, Theorem 9] observe that the raw Shapley–Shubik power index of the first player in game
(1, s1, . . . , sm; q + 1) is exactly (m − k)!k! · #SubsetSum(s1, . . . , sn; q). Since ϕs is parsimonious, this value is equal to
(n−m)!m! · #X3C(B, S).
We now provide functions ϕ and ψ that constitute a many–one reduction from #X3C′ to SS∗. We need to ensure that
for each #X3C′ instance X2 it holds that #X3C′(X) = ψ(SS∗(ϕ(X))). We first describe how to compute ϕ and ψ and then
explain why they have this property.
2 We assume that the inputs to ϕ satisfy the requirements of being #X3C′ instances. We implicitly replace any instance that does not fulfill this
requirement with a fixed instance that does satisfy it and that has no solutions.
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Given #X3C′ instance X , we compute ϕ(X) as follows: We compute SubsetSum instance ϕs(X) = (s1, . . . , sn; q) and
output game (1, s1, . . . , sn; q + 1). Function ψ is a little more involved. Define r1(n) = n!(2n)! and r2(n) = n!(2n)!23n.
Given a nonnegative integer x, we compute ψ(x) using the following algorithm. If x = 0 then return 0. Otherwise, find the
smallest nonnegative integer t such that r1(4t) ≤ x ≤ r2(4t) and output b xr1(4t )c. If there is no such t then return 0. Function
ψ(x) can be computed in polynomial time via computing r1(4t) and r2(4t) for successive values of t . It is easy to see that we
only need to try O(log x)many t ’s and thus ψ is computable in polynomial time with respect to the binary representation
of x.
Let us now show that indeed for any #X3C′ instance X it holds that #X3C′(X) = ψ(SS∗(ϕ(X))). Let X = (B, S) be
an arbitrary #X3C′ instance and let n be a nonnegative integer such that 13‖B‖ = 2n and ‖S‖ = 3n. (The existence
of such an n is guaranteed via the fact that in any #X3C′ instance
1
3 ‖B‖
‖S‖ = 23 .) Via the properties of ϕs and ϕ we see
that SS∗(ϕ(X)) = n!(2n)!#X3C′(X) = r1(n)#X3C′(X). It is easy to see that #X3C′(X) ≤ 23n and thus, assuming that
#X3C′(X) ≥ 1, we have that r1(n) ≤ SS∗(ϕ(X)) ≤ r2(n). Via routine calculationwe see that for any positive integer n it holds
that r1(4n) > r2(n). Thus the intervals [r1(4t), r2(4t)] are disjoint and given SS∗(ϕ(X)) as input, the function ψ correctly
identifies the r1(n) factor and outputs the answer #X3C′(X). Clearly, ψ also works correctly when SS∗(ϕ(X)) = 0. 
Lemma 2.9. There is a polynomial-time algorithm that given two X3C instances X = (Bx, Sx) and Y = (By, Sy) outputs two
X3C instances X ′′ = (B′′x , S′′x ) and Y ′′ = (B′′y , S′′y ) such that ‖B′′x‖ = ‖B′′y‖, ‖S′′x ‖ = ‖S′′y ‖, #X3C(X) = #X3C(X ′′), and
#X3C(Y ) = #X3C(Y ′′).
Proof. We first use the algorithm from Lemma 2.7 to derive instances X ′ = (B′x, S′x) and Y ′ = (B′y, S′y) such that
#X3C(X) = #X3C(X ′), #X3C(Y ) = #X3C(Y ′), 13 ‖B′x‖‖S′x‖ =
2
3 , and
1
3 ‖B′y‖
‖S′y‖ =
2
3 . Without the loss of generality we can assume that
‖B′x‖ ≤ ‖B′y‖. We set Y ′′ = Y ′ and derive X ′′ via repeatedly applying transformation h′ from Fact 2.6 to X ′, until the condition
of the theorem is met. 
In the next lemma and theorem we prove the PP-completeness of PowerCompareSS.
Lemma 2.10. Let f and g be two arbitrary #P functions. There exists a polynomial-time computable function cmpf ,g(x, y) such
that (∀x, y ∈ Σ∗)[f (x) > g(y) ⇐⇒ cmpf ,g(x, y) ∈ PowerCompareSS].
Proof. Let f and g be as in the lemma and let x and y be two arbitrary strings. Since both f and g are in #P and #X3C is #P-
parsimonious-complete, there exist functions ϕf and ϕg that compute parsimonious reductions from f to #X3C and from g
to #X3C, respectively.3
Let (Bx, Sx) = ϕf (x) and (By, Sy) = ϕg(y). Via Lemma 2.9 (and through a slight abuse of notation) we ensure that
‖Bx‖ = ‖By‖ = 3k and that ‖Sx‖ = ‖Sy‖ = r , where r and k are two nonnegative integers. Let ϕ be the reduction function
from the proof of Theorem 2.8. (Note that in the proof of Theorem 2.8 we restricted ϕ to work only on instances of X3C that
fulfill a special requirement. For the purpose of this proof we disregard this requirement.)
We now describe our function cmpf ,g . Given the instances X = (Bx, Sx) and Y = (By, Sy) we compute Gx = ϕ(X) and
Gy = ϕ(Y ). We define cmpf ,g(x, y) to output (Gx,Gy, 1). Via the properties of ϕ discussed in the proof of Theorem 2.8, it
holds that SS∗(Gx, 1) = (r−k)!k! ·#X3C(Bx, Sx) = (r−k)!k!f (x) and SS∗(Gy, 1) = (r−k)!k! ·#X3C(By, Sy) = (r−k)!k!g(y).
Thus f (x) > f (y) if and only if SS(Gx, 1) > SS(Gy, 1), and so it is clear that the function cmpf ,g doeswhat the theorem claims.
Naturally, cmpf ,g can be computed in polynomial time. 
Theorem 2.11. PowerCompareSS is PP-complete.
Proof. Via Lemma 2.2 it is easy to see that PowerCompareSS is in PP. Let h be some #P-parsimonious-complete function.
PP-hardness of PowerCompareSS follows via a reduction from the PP-complete problem Compareh (see Lemma 2.3). As a
reduction we can use, e.g., the function cmph,h from Lemma 2.10. This completes the proof. 
3. Conclusions and open problems
We have shown that the problem of deciding in which of the two given voting games our designated player has a higher
power index value is PP-complete for both the Banzhaf and the Shapley–Shubik power indices. For the case of Banzhaf,
we have used the fact that the raw Banzhaf power index is #P-parsimonious-complete. For the case of Shapley–Shubik,
we have shown that the raw Shapley–Shubik power index is #P-many–one-complete but not #P-parsimonious-complete.
Nonetheless, using the index’s properties we were able to show the PP-completeness of PowerCompareSS. We believe that
these results are interesting and practically important. Below we mention one particular application. In the context of
multiagent systems, the Shapley–Shubik power index is often used to distribute players’ payoffs, i.e., each player’s payoff
is proportional to his or her power index value. Recently Bachrach and Elkind [3] asked about the exact complexity of the
following problem: Given a weighted voting game G = (w1, w2, . . . , wn; q), is it profitable for players 1 and 2 to join? That
is, if G′ = (w1 + w2, w3, . . . , wn; q), is it the case that SS(G′, 1) > SS(G, 1)+ SS(G, 2). Using Lemma 2.10 and the fact that
3 We assume that neither ϕf nor ϕg ever outputs amalformed instance of X3C. This property is easy to enforce via the followingmodification:Whenever
either ϕf or ϕg is about to output a malformed instance, replace it with a fixed, correct one that has no solutions.
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#P is closed under addition we can easily show that this problem reduces to PowerCompareSS and thus is in PP. We believe
that Bachrach and Elkind’s problem is, in fact, PP-complete and that the techniques presented in this paper will lead to the
proof of this fact. However, at this point the exact complexity of the problem remains open.
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